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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES 
UTAH STATUTE 
It is unlawful in the State of Utah to drive or be in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle. Such conduct is prohibited by U.C.A. 41-6a-502 which provides: 
41-6a-502. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a 
combination of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration. 
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical 
test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of 
alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of 
safely operating a vehicle; or 
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at 
the time of operation or actual physical control. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
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U.C.A. 41-6a-501(2) defines a prior conviction referencing an out-of-state DUI 
in subsection viii. It provides: 
(viii) statutes or ordinances previously in effect in this state or in effect in 
any other state, the United States, or any district, possession, or territory of 
the United States which would constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 
alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving if 
committed in this state, including punishments administered under 10 
U.S.C.Sec.815. 
CALIFORNIA STATUTE 
California convictions would be based on a violation of their motor vehicle 
code section 23152 which provides: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the 
influence of any alcoholic beverage or drug, or under the combined 
influence of any alcoholic beverage and drug, to drive a vehicle. 
(b) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.08 percent or more, by weight, 
of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle. 
For purposes of this article and Section 34501.16, percent, 
By weight, of alcohol in a person's blood is based upon grams 
of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol 
per 210 liters of breath 
In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable 
presumption that the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, 
of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the 
person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her 
blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three hours 
after the driving 
(c) It is unlawful for any person who is addicted to the 
use of any drug to drive a vehicle. This subdivision shall 
not apply to a person who is participating in a narcotic treatment 
program approved pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 11875) 
of Chapter 1 of Part 3 of Division 10.5 of the Health and 
Safety Code 
(d) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.04 percent or more, by weight, 
of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a commercial motor vehicle, as defined 
in Section 15210. 
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution Article 1, Section 12; Utah 
Code Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Appellant challenges the trial court rulings where the trial court allowed 
California convictions (two) to be used for the purpose enhancing a class B 
misdemeanor to a third degree felony. Appellant argues the two California 
convictions do not meet the mandates under Utah law for purpose of enhancement 
as required under U.C.A. 41-6a-501(2). 
The trial court found the California statute to be broader than the Utah 
statute; however denied the appellant's motion. To be used to enhance a 
misdemeanor to a felony, the Utah statute requires that the prior offense would 
constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of 
both-related reckless driving if committed in this state 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Appellant entered a 'Sery' plea of guilty preserving his right to appeal the trial 
court's denial of his motion to dismiss the third degree felony. The trial court denied 
the motion to dismiss but allowed the 'Sery" plea to be entered. 
FACTUAL STATEMENT 
No evidence was taken in support of the defendant's motion to dismiss. The 
ruling of the trial court was based on the motions of the parties and oral argument 
only. The State produced no evidence to support their conclusion that the California 
convictions met the requirements of U.C.A. 41-6a-501(2). 
The parties submitted a stipulated order was submitted to the trial court 
which was then approved. The order provided the following: 
Defendant has challenged the current charge as a felony. Defendant 
asserts that prior convictions from the State of California do not qualify under 
the enhancement statute of the State of Utah. Section U.C.A. 41-6a-501(2) 
defines what constitutes a prior offense for purpose of enhancing a Dill to a 
felony categorization. 
The prior offenses arise out of the State of California. There is no assertion 
by the State that the defendant's offenses in California would qualify for a 
conviction in the State of Utah. 
The convictions are based on the California motor vehicle code, section 
23152. It provides: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the 
influence of any alcoholic beverage or drug, or under the combined influence 
of any alcoholic beverage and drug, to drive a vehicle. 
(b) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of 
alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle. 
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For purposes of this article and Section 34501.16, percent, 
By weight, of alcohol in a person's blood is based upon grams 
of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol 
per 210 liters of breath. 
The California statute allows a conviction to be obtained if the 
blood/alcohol test indicates an alcohol level exceeding 0.08 within three hours 
after driving. 
In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable 
presumption that the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, 
of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the 
person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her 
blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three hours 
after the driving. 
It also makes it unlawful for a person addicted to the use of any drug to 
drive a motor vehicle. 
(c) It is unlawful for any person who is addicted to the 
use of any drug to drive a vehicle. This subdivision shall 
not apply to a person who is participating in a narcotic treatment 
program approved pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 
11875) of Chapter 1 of Part 3 of Division 10.5 of the Health and 
Safety Code. 
Further, the conviction can be obtained if the blood alcohol level is 0.04 and 
the accused is driving a commercial vehicle. 
(d) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.04 percent or more, by weight, of 
alcohol in his or her blood to drive a commercial motor vehicle, as defined in 
Section 15210. 
The provision allowing a conviction for a blood alcohol level above 0.04 
within three hours is also present 
The Court concludes the California statute is broader than the Utah 
statute. 
The companion statute under which the defendant is accused is U.C.A. 
41-6a-502. It provides: 
41-6a-502. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination 
of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration. 
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical 
test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of 
alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle; or 
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of. 08 grams or greater at the 
time of operation or actual physical control. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol 
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
A Utah defendant is only subject to a felony enhancement if the prior 
convictions meet the definition set out by section U.C.A. 41-6a-501(2). See 
U.C.A. 41-6a-503(2)(b). U.C.A. 41-6a-501(2) defines a prior conviction 
referencing an out-of-state DUI in subsection viii. It provides: 
(viii) statutes or ordinances previously in effect in this state or in effect in any 
other state, the United States, or any district, possession, or territory of the 
United States which would constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 
alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving if 
committed in this state, including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. 
Sec.. 
The provisions of the California act do not parrot the Utah provisions 
of U.C.A. 41-6a-502. Convictions can be made out under the California laws 
which are not authorized under U.C.A. 41-6a-502. A conviction can exists if 
within three hours post-driving, the defendant had a blood alcohol level 
exceeding or equaling 0.08 in the case of passenger vehicles and 0.04 if a 
commercial vehicle was utilized. The offense can be made out if the accused 
was a drug addicted person and drove a vehicle. Further, the Utah act 
requires to be a controlled substance. California is not so limited. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the California statute is broader than the Utah statute, the 
Court denies the defendant's motion to strike the felony categorization. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence did not justify an enhancement of this misdemeanor offense to 
a felony status. The trial court found the California statute to be broader than the 
Utah statute. A conviction can thereby be obtained under the California statute when 
not justified by the Utah statute. Section 41-6a-501(2) requires the California 
conduct constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or alcohol, any drug, or a 
combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this state. 
No evidence was produced to justify such a conclusion. 
DETAILED ARGUMENT 
The language used in U.C.A. 41-6a-501(2)(a) expresses a legislative 
limitation or restriction on the use of out-of-state convictions. The State has to prove 
an out-of-state conviction would constitute a violation of U.C.A. 41-6a-502. No facts 
were introduced to justify such a conclusion. 
When comparing the statutes, Courts have presumed that the prior 
conviction does not necessarily fall within the proscription of the Utah statute. Courts 
have presumed the least offense punishable under the foreign law (California). 
People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150 
Enhancement is only permissible when the conduct underlying the foreign 
conviction would meet all of the elements of the Utah offense. People v. Guerrero 
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 343 [243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150; State v.Brooks. 968 
S.W.2d [312,] 313-14 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1997); State v. Reynolds.264 Conn. 1 
(2003); U.C.A. 41-6a-502; State v.Brooks. 968 S.W.2d [312,] 313-1 (Tenn.Crim.App. 
1997). 
See also Seguna v. Maketa, 181 P.3d 399 (Colo.App. 2008) finding a 
felony conviction in Michigan did not disqualify the petitioners request for a weapons 
permit; the Michigan offense did not qualify under the Colorado statutory scheme 
prohibiting the permit. 
A offense in one state may not presumptively qualify as a conviction in 
another state. The Arizona Court held that foreign conviction must meets specifically 
the Arizona offenses set out by their statutory scheme. State v. Kuntz, 209 Ariz. 276 
(App. 2004), 100 P.3d 26,437. The Court compared the elements of the Minnesota 
statue to the Arizona sex offender statute and concluded that Kuntz's conviction 
under M.S. § 609.344 did not necessarily prove that if he had committed the offense 
in Arizona he would have violated A.R.S. § 13-1406(A). The Minnesota conviction 
must have match identically to the Arizona statue and must exclude the possibility of 
conviction under Arizona law. 
First, if Kuntz was convicted of violating subsections (a), 
(b), or (d) of§ 609.344, which are not dependent on the victim's 
lack of consent, he would not have violated § 13-1406(A), which is 
dependent on the victim's lack of consent. Second, unlike the 
1981 version of §13-1406(A), § 609.344 did not require proof that 
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the victim was not the defendant's spouse. Third, and finally, 
assuming the Minnesota court convicted Kuntz of violating 
subsection (c) of§ 609.344, because the meaning of "force" under 
that provision is broader than the meaning of the term "without 
consent" as used in § 13-1406(A), conviction under the former 
does not necessarily prove the elements of the latter. Specifically, 
Minnesota defined "force" to include the "commission or threat of 
any other crime by the actor against the complainant or another," 
while Arizona limited "without consent" to mean "coerced by the 
immediate use or threatened use of force." See M.S. § 609.341(3) 
(1980); A.R. S. § 13-1401(5) (1978). Thus, it was possible to use 
"force" under M.S. § 609.344 by committing or threatening to 
commit a crime not involving the use or threat of physical force, 
such as extortion. 
Because it was possible for Kuntz to violate M.S. § 609.344 and not also 
violate A.R.S. § 13-1406(A), they decided that he was not required to register as a 
sex offender under A.R.S. § 13-3821 (A). 
In State v.Schaaf. 169 Ariz. 323, 333,819 P.2d 909, 919 (1991), the 
supreme court reviewed the aggravating circumstance for use in imposing the death 
penalty — whether "[t]he defendant was previously convicted of a felony in the 
United States involving the use or threat of violence on another person." The 
defendant in Schaaf contended that his prior Nevada convictions for attempted 
murder with a deadly weapon did not qualify as aggravating circumstances under 
this provision because attempted murder is a non-violent crime in Nevada. 169 Ariz, 
at 333, 819 P.2d at 919. The Court held the State was required to show that the 
particular offense must have excluded that it could "be perpetrated only with the use 
or threat of violence." Id. at 333-34, 819 P.2d at 919-20. 
In State v. Clouqh 
, 171 Ariz. 217, 219-20, 829 P.2d 1263,1265-66 (App. 1992) held that strict 
conformity was required between elements of foreign offense and Arizona offense 
before sentence enhancement under A.R.S. § 13-604(1) (1989) could apply. 
The California Court of Appeals considered whether a Colorado DUl statute 
was sufficient to enhance a California DUl to a felony. People v. Crane. 142 Cal. 
App.4th 425, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 334, 340 (2006). In California, as in Utah, a foreign 
conviction could be used for enhancement purposes only if it could be a conviction if 
committed there. Cal. Veh. Code § 23626. 
The court first looked to Colorado's statute to determine whether it satisfied 
all of the elements of section 23152. Crane's Colorado conviction was for driving 
while ability-impaired. Crane, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d at, 336. This statute prohibited 
driving a motor vehicle when the person was "affected to the slightest degree." Id. at 
338. However, California's DUl statute considered a person to be under the influence 
when a person was impaired to an appreciable degree. People v. Enriquez, 
42 Cal. App. 4th 661, 665 (Cal.Ct. App., 1996). 
The Court determined that a standard of being affected to the slightest 
degree was not high enough to render the conduct in Colorado a violation of 
California's statute requiring an appreciable degree of impairment, regardless of 
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Crane's blood alcohol levels. Crane at 340. The Utah statute requires that the 
defendant was incapable of driving the vehicle safely as opposed to California which 
requires a significantly less impact. U.C.A. 41-6a-502. 
In another case, the Federal Fourth Circuit compared Maryland and 
Virginia statutes for enhancement purposes and determined that a prior Maryland 
conviction could not be used for enhancement purposes in Virginia. United States v. 
Thomas, 367 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2004). They found the Virginia statute provided for 
use of foreign convictions to enhance a charge only if the statute on which the 
previous conviction is based was substantially similar to Virginia Code § 18.2-266. 
Thomas, 367 F.3d at 197. 
In Virginia, a person could be guilty of DUI for driving or operating a motor 
vehicle either with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 or more, or while 
under the influence of alcohol. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266 (2004). A test result of 0.08 
or more created a rebuttable presumption that the person had such concentration 
while driving and was under the influence while driving. Thomas, 367 F.3d at 198. 
While Maryland prohibited driving under the influence of alcohol and 
driving under the influence of alcohol per se. Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-902(a) 
(2003). Driving under the influence of alcohol per se occurred when a person 
showed a BAC of 0.08 or more at the time of testing. M.C.A. § 11 -127.1 (a) (2002). 
This alternative for conviction did not create a rebuttable presumption that the person 
was in fact driving under the influence of alcohol, but rather gave rise to an 
independent conviction merely for having a BAC of 0.08 or more. Thomas, 367 F.3d 
at 198. 
A Virginia conviction for driving under the influence per se would not be a 
conviction in Maryland (rebuttable presumption). Since Maryland's per se violation 
did not provide for a rebuttable presumption based on the blood alcohol 
concentration, the Maryland statute was deemed not to be substantially similar to the 
Virginia statute. Id. See also State v. Talbert, 622 N.W.2d 297 (Iowa 2007). 
California provides a rebuttable presumption while Utah does not. 
CALIFORNIA STATUTE 
California convictions would be based on a violation of their motor vehicle 
code section 23152 which provides: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the 
influence of any alcoholic beverage or drug, or under the combined 
influence of any alcoholic beverage and drug, to drive a vehicle. 
(b) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.08 percent or more, by weight, 
of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle. 
For purposes of this article and Section 34501.16, percent, 
By weight, of alcohol in a person's blood is based upon grams 
of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol 
per 210 liters of breath. 
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The California statute allows a conviction to be obtained if the blood/alcohol 
test indicates an alcohol level exceeding 0.08 within three hours after driving. 
In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable 
presumption that the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, 
of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the 
person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her 
blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three hours 
after the driving. 
It also makes it unlawful for a person addicted to the use of any drug to 
drive a motor vehicle. 
(c) It is unlawful for any person who is addicted to the 
use of any drug to drive a vehicle. This subdivision shall 
not apply to a person who is participating in a narcotic treatment 
program approved pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 
11875) of Chapter 1 of Part 3 of Division 10.5 of the Health and 
Safety Code. 
Further, the conviction can be obtained if the blood alcohol level is 0.04 and 
the accused is driving a commercial vehicle. 
(d) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.04 percent or more, by weight, 
of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a commercial motor vehicle, as 
defined in Section 15210. 
The provision allowing a conviction for a blood alcohol level above 0.04 
within three hours is also present. 
For a defendant to be in violation of Cal. Veh. Code § 23152(a), the alcohol 
or drug "must have so far affected the nervous system, the brain, or muscles of the 
individual as to impair to an appreciable degree the ability to operate a vehicle in a 
manner like that of an ordinarily prudent and cautious person in full possession of his 
faculties." People v. Enriquez, 42 Cal. App. 4th 661, 665 (Cal.Ct.App., 1996). 
UTAH STATUTE 
It is unlawful in the State of Utah to drive or be in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle. Such conduct is prohibited by U.C.A. 41-6a-502 which provides: 
41-6a-502. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a 
combination of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration. 
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical 
test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of 
alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of 
safely operating a vehicle; or 
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at 
the time of operation or actual physical control. 
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(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
As compared to the California statute, the Utah statute has no rebuttable 
presumption. California M.V.A 23152 . Under Utah law, a person may be considered 
to be driving under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders him/her 
'incapable to safely operate' a motor vehicle. This is compare to California which 
requires a lesser standard of only an 'appreciable degree of impairment'. People v. 
Enriquez, 42 Cal. App. 4th 661, 665 (Cal.Ct.App., 1996). 
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2010. 
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Addendum to Brief 
1. Court's Ruling. 
2. California statute. 
California Code 
CALIFORNIA VEHICLE CODE 
DIVISION 11. RULES OF THE ROAD 
Chapter 12. Public Offenses 
Article 2. Offenses Involving Alcohol and Drugs 
§ 23152 Veh. 
[EDITORS' NOTE: SEE BELOW FOR ADDITIONAL VERSION.] 
(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of any 
alcoholic beverage or drug, or under the combined influence of any 
alcoholic beverage and drug, to drive a vehicle. 
(b) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.08 percent or more, by 
weight, of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle. 
For purposes of this article and Section 34501.16, percent, by 
weight, of alcohol in a person's blood is based upon grams of alcohol 
per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of 
breath. 
In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable 
presumption that the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of 
alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the 
person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her 
blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three 
hours after the driving. 
(c) It is unlawful for any person who is addicted to the use of any 
drug to drive a vehicle. This subdivision shall not apply to a 
person who is participating in a narcotic treatment program approved 
pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 11875) 
of Chapter 1 of Part 3 of Division 10.5 of the Health and Safety Code. 
(d) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.04 percent or more, by 
weight, of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a commercial motor 
vehicle, as defined in Section 15210. 
In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable 
presumption that the person had 0.04 percent or more, by weight, of 
alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the 
person had 0.04 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her 
blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three 
hours after the driving. 
(e) This section shall become operative on January 1,1992, and 
shall remain operative until the director determines that federal 
regulations adopted pursuant to the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety 
Act of 1986 (49 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.) contained in Section 
383.51 or 391.15 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations do 
not require the state to prohibit operation of commercial vehicles 
when the operator has a concentration of alcohol in his or her blood 
of 0.04 percent by weight or more. 
(f) The director shall submit a notice of the determination under 
subdivision (e) to the Secretary of State, and this section shall be 
repealed upon the receipt of that notice by the Secretary of State. 
(Amended (as amended by Stats. 1992, Ch. 974, sec. 16) by 
Stats. 1995, Ch. 455, sec. 31. Effective September 5,1995.) 
§23152 
[EDITORS' NOTE: SEE ABOVE FOR ADDITIONAL VERSION.] 
(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of any 
alcoholic beverage or drug, or under the combined influence of any 
alcoholic beverage and drug, to drive a vehicle. 
(b) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.08 percent or more, by 
weight, of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle. 
For purposes of this article and Section 34501.16, percent, by 
weight, of alcohol in a person's blood is based upon grams of alcohol 
per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of 
breath. 
In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable 
presumption that the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of 
alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the 
person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her 
blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three 
hours after the driving. 
(c) It is unlawful for any person who is addicted to the use of any 
drug to drive a vehicle. This subdivision shall not apply to a 
person who is participating in a narcotic treatment program approved 
pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 11875) 
of Chapter 1 of Part 3 of Division 10.5 of the Health and Safety Code. 
(d) This section shall become operative only upon the receipt by 
the Secretary of State of the notice specified in subdivision (f) of 
Section 23152, as added by Section 25 of Chapter 1114 of the Statutes 
of 1989. 
(Amended (as amended by Stats. 1992, Ch. 974, sec. 17) by 
Stats. 1995, Ch. 455, sec. 32. Effective September 5,1995.) 
